

payer pays to payee, who receives money

different values

transferable

anonymous not linked to owner

untraceable serial number

unforgeable

hard to duplicate

for a e-cash scheme, we need

withdrawal

payment

deposit

first attempt: signed (serial number, value)

second attempt: immediate deposit, payment succeeds if serial number not claimed before

blinding R prepares blinded message $M' = b(M)$
 signing R sends M' to S; S replies with signature σ' on M'
 unblinding R extracts signature σ for M from M'

one-more unforgeability Oracle calls does not imply ℓ signatures

Unlinkability signature cannot be connected to specific blinded message

RSA signatures require redundancy (e.g. form of hash)



blind signature: but can still blind message by multiplying hash by invertible ^{random} constant

multiply by r^e

divide by r / multiply by r^{-1}

information-theoretically unlinkable

unforgeability: random oracle issues due to blinding

denominations with relatively prime exponents

7th root cannot be obtained from 3th root and 5th root

offline version: embed identity in each coin

challenge-response:

single run leaks no user information

two runs leaks user identity